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Hypercomputational formal theories will, clearly, be both struc-
turally and foundationally different from the formal theories un-
derpinning computational theories. However, many of the maps
that might guide us into this strange realm have been lost. So lit-
tle work has been done recently in the area of metamathematics,
and so many of the previous results have been folded into other
theories, that we are in danger of loosing an appreciation of the
broader structure of formal theories.
As an aid to those looking to develop hypercomputational theo-
ries, we will briefly survey the known landmarks both inside and
outside the borders of computational theory. We will not focus
in this paper on why the structure of formal theory looks the way
it does. Instead we will focus on what this structure looks like,
moving from hypocomputational, through traditional computa-
tional theories, and then beyond to hypercomputational theories.
Key words: metamathematics, hypocomputation, hypercomputation, ef-
fective computation
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Returning to Metamathematics
Our main guide to the broader structure of formal theory comes from research
in the field of metamathematics. Very loosely, the field of metamathematics
? email: d.love@shu.ac.uk
1
ar
X
iv
:0
70
6.
34
79
v1
  [
cs
.O
H]
  2
3 J
un
 20
07
tries to “apply mathematics to itself”: using only rigorous mathematical the-
ories to probe the structure and foundations of mathematics. Or at least it did
once.
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, metamathe-
matics was a very active field. The search for the foundations of mathematics
was on, and those mathematicians and logicians involved in research in meta-
mathematics were leading the charge.
Ultimately, that particular search for a foundational theory of mathemat-
ics failed. Nonetheless, research in metamathematics has provided the foun-
dation for many modern theories of mathematics — particularly the formal
theories of computation.
We are not, though, aiming to present a metamathematical map of for-
mal theories in all their technical glory here. Rather our aim is to highlight
the main results, hoping to make them accessible to the general body of re-
searchers engaged in hypercomputational research. In essence, we aim to
point out useful structures and foundations which may not be obvious at first
sight to those only familiar with computational theories. By exposing the
broader structures of formal theory, we hope to prompt further discussion of
hypercomputation — and possibly even a renewal of interest in metamathe-
matics.
Undeniably, metamathematics is not now a particularly active field. Nonethe-
less, most of our understanding of formal theory (especially the broader struc-
tures) comes from this field. Since the Second World War, however, many
metamathematical results have been re-cast as computational theories. But in
the translation, some important details have been lost.
The recent focus on computational theory leaves us with two problems
when we return to a more general discussion of formal theories. Firstly, many
of the best known metamathematical results are known only through the lens
of computational theory. Secondly, much of the terminology in computational
theory is derived from the metamathematical theory.
Individually these difficulties are minor. Together, though, they can ob-
scure important details in the structure of formal theories.
For instance, many presentations of computational theory make use of ab-
stract machines first proposed by Alan Turing in his 1936 paper On Com-
putable Numbers, With An Application To The Entscheidungsproblem [12,
30]. We will not go into the details of the machines proposed by Turing
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here? , other than to note they are universally popular as means of present-
ing results in computational theory. Although universal, the machines known
as ‘Turing Machines’ in computational theory follow the pattern of one of
two machines types identified by Turing. In his original paper Turing notes
that [30, p. 232]:
For some purposes we might use machines (choice machines
or c-machines) whose motion is only partially determined by the
configuration. . . . When such a machine reaches one of these
ambiguous configurations, it cannot go on until some arbitrary
choice has been made by an external operator. . . . In this paper I
deal only with automatic machines, and will therefore often omit
the prefix a-.
For computational theory the distinction between the a-machines and c-
machines is irrelevant — like Turing, computational theory only considers
the actions of automatic machines. Hence if we confine our attention to com-
putational theory, we can indeed forget all about choice machines.
We must not forget, though, that Turing is writing in the context of meta-
mathematical theories: not computational ones. Metamathematical theories,
though, can (and indeed do) allow very different foundations for theories de-
scribing the actions of c-machines and those restricted to a-machines. Con-
fusion is therefore bound to arise if we forget the context and treat all ‘Turing
machines’ as automatic machines in the sense of computational theories.
For instance, some researchers in computational theory define automatic
machines as ‘deterministic Turing machines’ and choice machines as ‘non-
deterministic Turing machines’ [2]. This, though, requires the underlying
structure of the choice facing the “external operator” to be exactly the same
as the structure of the choice facing the machine. If accept this assumption,
then we can effectively ignore the operator: both a-machines and c-machines
are then governed by the same structural theories. Thus we can derive a ‘ma-
chine’ theory the adequately covers both ‘kinds’ of machine.
These structural assumptions may seem reasonable. Indeed they are so
common that very few modern discussions even mention the possible prob-
lems posed by c-machines. But can we really assume the structural assump-
tions underpinning a-machines are always exactly the same as the structural
assumptions underpinning c-machines?
In computational theory the answer appears to be ‘yes’. We know of no
? Readers looking for more details of these machines may want to briefly review §4 first.
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case where the structural assumptions used for a-machines fail to adequately
describe c-machines.
However, in computational theories this answer is essentially a ‘proof by
definition’. We have defined c-machines in terms of the structural theories
underpinning a-machines. Hence we should not reasonably expect any dif-
ferences.
But what happens if we step outside the structural theories underpinning
a-machines? Can we uncover a new set of structural assumptions that allows
a broader (but still rigorous) definition of a c-machines? Even if we found
such a theory, how could we sensibly relate it to the computational theory
underpinning a-machines?
In this paper we contest that we can indeed find rigorous mathematical
theories that allow a sensible, but broader, definition of c-machines† . More-
over, we can relate the these to the computational theories underpinning a-
machines; thereby showing how the structural assumptions of the c-machines
relate to those of the a-machines.
We can create these broader theories because metamathematical theories
allow a broader range of structural assumptions than simple computational
theory. Computational theory is, after all, only one example of a formal the-
ory permitted by metamathematical methods and under metamathematical
assumptions. However, discussing these broader theories requires at least a
passing familiarity with metamathematical theory — even if we seem to be
covering the same ground as computational theory. We cannot simply use
computational theory as a substitute for metamathematics.
Nonetheless, given the paucity of activity in metamathematics since the
1950s, it seems unreasonable to expect the reader to be as familiar with meta-
mathematics as they might be with computation. Readers who are familiar
with Hilbert’s metamathematical program (and the main results) might want
to skip to the discussion on the structure of formal theories in §2. For the rest
of us we will first look briefly at the motivation for metamathematics: par-
ticularly the relationship between metamathematics and the formal theories
underlying computational theory. From this brief examination, we can return
to the main discussion, again focusing on the metamathematical highlights,
but without going into the details. We will, though, point out sources for those
interested in further exploration.
† As an illustration of what a broader choice machine may look like, and particularly the
foundations of such machines, the reader is referred to §3 and §4
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1.2 The Place of Formal Theory
Why ‘Metamathematics’?
In modern mathematical use, the term ‘formal’ is most often used in com-
putational theories or modern logics. However, the term first appeared in the
late 19th century, during the search for a grand unified theory of mathematics.
Although this search ultimately ended without finding a grand theory, math-
ematicians engaged in the search have provided us with most of our current
understanding of the structure of mathematics (and formal theories). In addi-
tion, this search produced the branch of mathematics known as metamathe-
matics, from which the founding theories of computation later emerged. Al-
though metamathematics has not received much in the way of in-depth study
in the last 60 years, if we are serious about understanding the foundations of
computational theories, metamathematics remains the best place to start.
Before we move onto the structure and assumptions of formal theory,
though, we ought to define what we mean by ‘metamathematics’. A full in-
troduction to this subject (and its history) is beyond the scope of this paper‡ .
For our purposes here, we will use a later description of the scope and aims
of metamathematics, given by Stephen Kleene [19, p. 64]:
Metamathematics must study the formal system as a system
of symbols, etc. which are considered wholly objectively. This
means simply that those symbols, etc. are themselves the ulti-
mate objects, are not being used to refer to something other than
themselves. The metamathematician looks at them, not through
and beyond them; thus they are objects without interpretation or
meaning.
Perhaps the most controversial statement in this definition is Kleene’s use
of the term ‘formal’ to describe the object of metamathematical study. From
our familiarity with computational theory and formal logic, we are used to the
term ‘formal’ as the manipulation of “objects without interpretation or mean-
ing”. This modern sense of the term ‘formal’, though, usually only refers to
the application of formal assumptions to axiomatic systems¶ . Kleene is using
the the term ‘formal’ in the original sense of David Hilbert: and Hilbert, in
‡ For an accessible introduction to metamathematics, together with the main results and theo-
ries, see Stephen Kleene’s Introduction to Metamathematics [19]. Kleene also gives an excellent
summary of the history and motivation for metamathematics in Chapter III of his Introduction,
A Critique of Mathematical Reasoning. Another good commentary on the early contenders for a
full theory of mathematics is given by Kleene in Mathematical Logic [18, Ch IV, §36],
¶ An axiomatic system uses a finite number of axioms (or postulates) as founding assumptions
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turn, was interested in the most basic properties of a mathematical theory. As
Kleene notes, in Hilbert’s view a ‘formal theory’ is slightly more general than
an axiomatic theory [19, p. 60]:
Since we have abstracted entirely from the content or matter,
leaving only the form, we say the original theory has been for-
malized.. . . We say be reference to the form alone which combi-
nation of words are sentences, which sentences are axioms, and
which sentences follow as immediate consequences from others.
Although this distinction may seem subtle, the modern use of the term ‘for-
mal’ essentially eliminated metamathematics as a branch of serious academic
study.
The problem is that all the classic formal theories (including computation)
turned out to be axiomatic theories. Moreover, even by the end of the 1930s§
mathematicians seemed to have found a basic equivalence between (Hilbert’s)
formal theories and axiomatic theories. Even more convincingly, all known
equivalences relied on basic properties in number theory; which many math-
ematicians regard as one of the best described and understood branches of
mathematics.
This seeming weight of evidence in favour of equating formal theory and
axiomatic theory led Alfred Tarski to denounce any separation between the
(formal) methods of David Hilbert’s and the rest of mathematics [24]:
In [Tarski’s] view, metamathematics became similar to any
mathematical discipline. Not only its concepts and results can be
mathematized, but they actually can be integrated into mathemat-
ics.. . . Tarski destroyed the borderline between metamathematics
and mathematics.
Although the opinion of Tarski and others led to a near abandonment of
metamathematics, this view implies a very precise structure of mathematics.
and conditions for the mathematical system. The (logical) consequences of these axioms are
then used to develop a full theory of the system [19, §8]. In most modern axiomatic theories,
the derivation from the axioms is achieved by applying only those rules permitted by formal
theory [18]. Hence the usual modern relationship between axiomatic and formal theories.
§ Alonzo Church, creator of the first modern computational theory, defined his famous thesis
relating effective decidable predicates (formal logic) to effectively calculable functions (number
theory) in 1936 [7],[19, §60]. This thesis is now known as Church’s Thesis (or, occasionally, the
Church-Turing Thesis after applying Church’s arguments to the model of computation developed
by Alan Turing), and its proof remains one of the central problems of modern mathematics [6, 10]
and computation [9].
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If Tarski’s view is correct, then it would also seem to rule out hypercom-
putational theories, since these break certain accepted properties of formal
theories|| . Nonetheless, it appears Tarski’s view of the structure of mathe-
matics is incorrect: at least if we believe the metamathematical results of the
1930s.
Therefore, if we are interested in hypercomputation, we need to know
whether hypercomputational theories fit into the accepted structure of math-
ematics. This means turning again to the metamathematics of the 1930s, to
review the foundations of our current understanding.
The Structure of Mathematics
Trying to work out a structure for the whole of mathematical theory would
seem to be a monumental undertaking. Indeed most of our current under-
standing evolved during 80 years of sustained effort, from the mid 19th cen-
tury to the 1930s. Fortunately, though, since most of the results occur at the
edges of formal theory, we are not required to know them. By looking at
the main results, we can, therefore, quickly build up an map of most of the
structures we are interested in.
We will start our exploration at the end of the 19th century, with the work
of the German mathematician David Hilbert. Although David Hilbert was not
the first to try to find ‘the’ founding theory of mathematics, his work guided
and shaped most of the programme from the late 19th century to the middle
of the 1930s. For Hilbert, a full guide to the structure of mathematics ought to
be divided into three distinct “theories”, described by Kleene as follows [19,
p. 65]:
In the full picture [of mathematics], there will be three sep-
arate and distinct “theories”: (a) the informal theory of which
the formal system constitutes a formalization, (b) the formal sys-
tem or object theory, and (c) the metatheory, in which the formal
system is described and studied.
Following this line of reasoning, and simplifying somewhat, we can draw
up a view of the structure of mathematics along the lines of Figure 1. For-
mal theory in Figure 1 becomes a distinct region of mathematics, with its
own structure and identity. This does not mean formal theory is the only pos-
sible source of mathematical theories, though. Alongside formal theory we
also have informal mathematical theories, again with its distinctive structures
|| As we will examine in §3
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Mathematics
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Mathematics
FIGURE 1
A Naı¨ve View of the Structure of Mathematics
and a separate identity. The challenge, then, is relating the formal and infor-
mal theories of mathematics, without violating the structure and identity of
either. This is the task of the metatheory, shown as an equivalence relation
in Figure 1. By carefully constructing the metatheory, we hope to provide
a foundation for the formal theory — without allowing the paradoxes and
untidiness of the informal to cross the divide# .
Metamathematics is, essentially, the creation and study of this ‘equiva-
lence’ relation between formal and informal theory. Controversy only arises
when we ask “what is the nature of this metatheory”?
Tarski argued strongly for the metatheory being a formal theory. If we
then place formal theory on an axiomatic foundation, we can go further and
argue for the elimination of the metatheory as a distinct theory. For both
the ‘metatheory’ and the formal theory have the same (or at least equivalent)
foundation, and are governed by the same (axiomatic) rules. Since one theory
can now be re-written in terms of the other, the distinction ‘metatheory’ and
the formal theory seems (at best) academic.
Abandoning the distinction between the ‘metatheory’ and formal theory
also allows us to abandon informal mathematical theories. If the old ‘metathe-
ory’ relates informal and formal mathematics, by removing the ‘metatheory’
we can use (axiomatic) formal theory in place of informal theory. An (ax-
iomatic) formal theory is always sufficient, since every informal theory has a
(axiomatic) formal equivalent.
Our problem, though, is that Figure 1 represents an extreme simplification
# Unfortunately, though, it appears that paradoxes are just as necessary to the foundations of
formal theory as they are to the informal. What we did learn from Hilbert’s programme, though,
was how to create more limited formal theories, avoiding at least some of the paradoxes. Of these
limited formal theories, the axiomatic formal theories have proved to be particularly useful.
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FIGURE 2
The Structure of Mathematics at the End of the 1930s
of the structure of mathematics as understood at the end of the 1930s. It would
be tempting to conclude from Figure 1 that the region of formal mathematics
are the same ‘size’ as the region of informal mathematics. If this were the
case, we might reasonably expect to find a formal equivalent of every informal
theory. However, by the end of the 1930s, the structure of mathematics looked
much more like Figure 2.
Here, in Figure 2, informal mathematics not only covers the entire region
of formal mathematics — but quite a bit more. In other words, Figure 2 sug-
gests we might have informal theories that cannot be fully formalised: some
properties will always remain beyond the borders of formal theory. Moreover,
the metatheory in Figure 2 cannot simply be eliminated. Instead the metathe-
ory also has its own distinct identity — the metatheory becomes a ‘filter’:
condensing informal structures into a shape acceptable to formal theory. In
this case formal theory might also be more general than simple axiomatic the-
ories, since the properties of the formal theory depend on the metatheory. We
could imagine situations where the metatheory allows an axiomatic statement
of a formal theory. In general, though, we are not limited to these situations.
For example, Georg Cantor’s definition of a ‘set’ attempts to capture in a
rigours theory our intuitive notions about ‘collections’ of ‘objects’ [19, Chap-
ter 1]. Using Cantor’s theory, we seem to be able to capture and define math-
ematical notions, for instance cardinality and the relationship between the
natural and rational numbers. It would appears, then, that Cantor’s notion of
a set qualifies as a valid mathematical theory. Yet, when we attempt to de-
fine certain mathematical notions using Cantor’s theory, we run into a series
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of paradoxes. Most famously, Bertrand Russel is identified with the paradox
that results when trying to define the boundary properties of certain infinite
sets permitted by Cantor’s theory [8, Russell’s Paradox].
In axiomatic set theories we attempt to avoid this paradoxes by limiting
our notion of a ‘set’. We can no longer capture the full, informal, notion of
a set permitted by Cantor’s naı¨ve set theory. However, our formal axiomatic
set theories don’t have any paradoxes. This leaves an open question: how
close to the naı¨ve notion of a set can we get using only formal (preferably
axiomatic) theories?
Prominent philosophers of mathematics such as Rudolf Carnap, and math-
ematicians like Haskell Curry, have argued that the situation depicted in Fig-
ure 2 is only temporary [6, 10]. They argue that one day we will find a way
of dealing with previously unsolvable informal (and formal) problems using
only axiomatic formal theory.
We will not deal here in detail with the objections to an axiomatic foun-
dation of mathematics; only noting in passing that the axiomatic view is not
uncontested [5, 15]. Moreover, since the 1930s the boundary of axiomatic
formal theory has not changed. It seems at least possible, then, for the older
view of formal theory to offer something in our search for a more general
foundation for computation, particularly given the immense strides taken in
our understanding of axiomatic formal theory and computational theory since
the 1930s.
So, rather than debate whether the axiomatic position is ultimately correct,
we will simply assume the structure of mathematics resembles the one shown
in Figure 2. If we can find a hypercomputational theory within this formal
structure, we will have a useful starting point. Whether such a theory can
ultimately be placed entirely within the bounds of an axiomatic formal theory
is another argument: and one outside the bounds of this paper.
2 A METAMATHEMATICAL VIEW OF COMPUTATION
2.1 The Place of the Metatheory
We will begin our investigation of computation by simplifying the previous
discussion somewhat, in order to focus more clearly on the metatheory. Once
we have the basic structure in place, we can use known results of formal the-
ory to give us an insight into the formal restrictions on the metatheory. Finally
we will generalise these restrictions using informal assumptions, leaving us
with the foundations of hypocomputational theories (the next section, §3 will
explore these hypocomputational theories in more detail).
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(b) . . . to the structure of the metatheory
FIGURE 3
The Place of the Metatheory in Formal and Informal Mathematics
Our starting point, therefore, is the simplified structure of mathematics
shown in Figure 2. We are not interested in any particular formal (or informal)
theory, so we can focus on an arbitrary region on the border between formal
and informal theory (shown in Figure 3(a)). Restricting our focus to this
arbitrary region, we can make a further simplification to produce the general
structure shown in Figure 3(b).
The general structure shown in Figure 3 may seem entirely too arbitrary to
have any use. Its strength, though, comes from precisely the same arguments
used by Tarski to denounce metamathematics. For we know from these argu-
ments that under certain conditions the formal theory is independent of the
metatheory. Under these specific conditions the structural assumptions of the
formal theory and the metatheory are said to be equivalent. Thus under these
conditions we can use this structural equivalence to freely interchange both
theory and metatheory.
Thus by understanding these conditions, we can establish one aspect of
the relationship between the formal theory and the metatheory. We can go
further though, by studying the conditions where we cannot interchange the
metatheory and formal theory, i.e. those conditions where the formal theory
is dependent on the metatheory.
We will return to the relationship between this wider formal theory and
computation shortly (in §2.3). First, though, we will study in more detail the
conditions where the formal theory becomes dependent on the metatheory for
its own structure and behaviour.
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2.2 Formal Restrictions on the Metatheory
The greatest strength of any formal theory lies in the minimal number of
assumptions needed about the form or structure of a theory. This strength
also allows us to focus narrowly on a few basic assumptions, leaving aside
the considerations of any particular formal theory. From this narrow focus,
we can then return to a more general investigation of the relationship between
formal theory and metatheory.
One feature of axiomatic formal theories is their association with elemen-
tary number theory, in particular certain relations with the ordinal numbers?? .
Ordinal, or ‘counting’, numbers are simply the positive integers (often writ-
ten as the set Z+ in older metamathematical literature, or N+ in modern no-
tation): 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ..
From John von Neumann’s work on set theory, we know we can obtain
the ordinal numbers from the most basic of sets: the empty set, ∅†† . In all
versions of set theory the empty set is truly empty, having by definition no
objects or elements as members. Yet it still has form; enough, at least to
define itself and the ordinal numbers.
We can use this form to obtain the ordinal number as follows [34]. First
we start with the empty set itself, and define this to be equal to the ordinal 0
0 = ∅,
we can then obtain the next ordinal by defining it as the set including the
previous ordinal. Since ∅ is empty we can ignore it, and thus we define 1 as
1 = {∅},
By extending this set and continuing, we obtain
2 = {∅, {∅}},
?? Strictly this association is only true of all formal theories if Church’s Thesis (discussed in
§1.2) is true. Although currently unproven, the evidence for the thesis is strong (at least for
axiomatic formal theories) [18, 19]. We will assume its truth for the remainder of the paper,
although our conclusion can be shown to hold even if Church’s Thesis is false.
†† The following definition of ordinal numbers is known to apply in both Georg Cantor’s naı¨ve
set theory and modern axiomatic theory. For a discussion of later work on axiomatic set the-
ory using this definition of ordinals see von Nuemann’s own definition of an axiomatic set the-
ory [33], and Jean van Heijenoort’s commentary on von Nuemann’s 1923 paper [32, pp. 346–
347].
For convenience we will use the usual modern notation for the empty set (∅), rather than the
previously common notation used by von Neumann (O).
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3 = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}, . . .
We know we can use this sequence of ordinals as the foundation of at least
some axiomatic theories [19]. But does this sequence tell us anything more
general about the relationship between formal theory and the metatheory?
Ideally a formal theory should be both self-contained, and self-describing.
In other words, we should be able to use all the tools provided by the theory,
without having to bring in statements or assumptions from elsewhere (espe-
cially those borrowed from an informal theory). This requires, firstly, that the
ideal formal is closed; all the objects necessary to the theory can be described
by the theory, and no object outside the theory has any validity within the the-
ory. Secondly an ideal formal theory is complete; meaning the theory covers
the valid relationships between the objects of the theory exactly‡‡
Closure and completeness may be the ideal of any formal theory, but most
known axiomatic formal theories are not simultaneously closed and com-
plete [23]. Note that closure and completeness are binary properties in an
axiomatic formal theory — you can’t have an axiomatic theory that is “al-
most complete” or “almost closed”. Formal theories failing the closure re-
quirement we call open, and those failing the completeness requirements are
called incomplete.
Returning to the sequence of ordinals, we see that each member of the
sequence past 0 contains at least two empty sets. For instance, the sequence
representing the ordinal 1 (= ∅, {∅},= {∅},) contains two empty sets: ∅
(= 0), followed by a successor set containing only the empty set ({∅}).
Whether these two empty sets are in any way ‘equivalent’ is irrelevant. In
practise, most formal theories do assume the empty set is always equivalent
to itself (∅ ≡ ∅). Even so, the question in this context is meaningless: any
content of the empty set is unimportant, for the sequence depends only on the
ability to relate to the empty set.
What this sequence of ordinals does show, however, is that we can divide
a literal void into a series of non-interacting regions. In other words, we can
start with ‘nothing’ and derive a minimal series of structural assumptions.
We can then relate these structural assumptions to the closure assumptions of
some formal theories. Critically, though, these derived structural assumptions
should not have to specify exactly what the actual structure of the void is.
Questions about the void remain meaningless in the closed formal theory.
‡‡ That is, all valid relationships between objects are covered by the theory; all invalid relation-
ships are excluded by the theory; and the relationships permitted by one statement of the theory
do not differ from those permitted by any other statement of the theory.
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Even from these minimal assumptions, though, we know that we can relate
non-interacting regions in some manner. We can actually be more specific,
and infer this relationship as completeness in some formal theories. Again,
though, these relationships can not (and do not) say anything about the actual
relationships permitted in the void. The void remains devoid of structure and
meaning in closed and complete formal theories.
But what about open and incomplete formal theories?
We can incorporate these theories into the same structure by removing the
minimal form of the empty set. This leaves us with a simple, undifferentiated
void; one entirely featureless and without any assumed structure. Instead of
a formal theory relying on itself to determine the structure and relationships
within this void, it must instead rely on the metatheory to create these struc-
tures and relationships on behalf of the formal theory.
Let us therefore allow the metatheory to make a division in this void, creat-
ing a region to the ‘left’ and to the ‘right’ of the division. What requirements
would a closed formal theory have for this division?
The first requirement would be the ability to differentiate between the two
regions. A void with a division is different to the original void, and each
region has its own identity. For instance, in the ordinal sequence our first
division creates two regions. One region remains the void, the other is distinct
enough to be called the empty set (∅). Identity, though, is not quite enough.
As we saw above, no region can interact with the larger void. For example, in
our derivation of 1 we obtained the set containing the empty set ({∅}). But
this same set appears in the derivation of 2: the new sets grows by adding
further divisions, not by coalescing previous divisions.
If our metatheory failed to uphold these structural criteria, we could not
call the resultant formal theory closed. For the theory now depends directly
on the structural properties of the void — properties the theory can neither
fully capture nor give meaning to.
However, we could call these ‘failed’ theories open and continue to use
them. For open formal theories do not require distinct identities for the region,
nor do they exclude all interactions between the divisions.
For the sake of argument we could then get the metatheory to make an-
other division, creating a new non-interacting region. We now have two non-
interacting regions; both separate from the larger void. Since they are non-
interacting, we cannot look to the void for inspiration. We can, however, turn
to the metatheory. What if the metatheory could tell us how to relate the two
14
regions?
In the case of the ordinals we have assumed the metatheory will do ex-
actly that. For instance, if we have the empty set (∅) and our next division
produces the set containing the empty set ({∅}), we know we can relate these
two divisions to produce ∅, {∅}. Simplifying we produce {∅}, which our
metatheory tells us is the ordinal 1.
What, though, if our metatheory cannot tell us how (or even if) two regions
are related? Again, we could not use such a metatheory to create a complete
formal theory. We could, though, still use the metatheory in incomplete for-
mal theories; accepting that under some circumstances our metatheory would
fail to guide us and that our formal theories might therefore be inconsistent.
Thus by studying the relationship between the metatheory and formal the-
ories, we can gain insight into the more general structure and requirements
of formal theories. However, we are not interested in formal theory as such,
but specifically in computational theory. And computational theories have a
few additional structural assumptions to guide us. Of these assumptions, the
most important is the validity of any conclusion (“output”) is independent of
the validity of the question (“input”)¶¶ . So do the structures outlined in this
section bear any relationship to the structure of computational theory?
2.3 A General Scheme for Computation
We saw in the previous section how we could infer a general relationship
between the metatheory and formal theories. But we have not yet shown how
this general structure relates specifically to computational theories. In this
section we will briefly outline this relationship, before moving onto specific
forms of computation in the following sections.
In relating the general structure of formal theories to computational theo-
ries, we will start with Alan Turing’s consideration of the ordinal sequence,
published in his 1939 paper Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals [31]. In
Systems of Logic Turing builds on certain results in number theory studied
¶¶ In computational theory, validity and truth are distinct (if related) concepts. Validity simply
means we have some expression of the input and output in terms of the structural assumptions
of the theory; for instance, a closed alphabet of symbols. If we accept the input (or output) as
valid, we still have questions relating to the truth of the statement. For example, the statement
“1 + 1 = 3” is clearly valid if we accept a closed alphabet containing the symbols ‘1’, ’3’, ‘+’,
‘=’. Nonetheless, we would have difficulty in creating an arithmetic theory expressing the truth
of this statement, assuming we accept the usual intuitive notions and meanings of arithmetical
statements. Loosely, then, computational theories are essentially theories that try to determine
the truth (or falsity) of any statement valid in a closed theory.
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in his earlier 1936 paper, On Computable Numbers, With an Application to
the Entscheidungsproblem [30]. We are less interested here in the results of
Systems of Logic, than in Turing’s discussion of his a-machines, first defined
in On Computable Numbers (and briefly earlier discussed in §1.1). Again
the details of the a-machines are unimportant here; for the moment we will
simply note that a-machines are accepted as the foundation of at least one
computational theory [12]§§ .
In On Computable Numbers Turing focuses on the decision problem (in
German the Entscheidungsproblem) in elementary arithmetic. This decision
problem relates to Hilbert’s program of formalising mathematics, and is es-
sentially the question of whether we can always determine whether a state-
ment in elementary arithmetic is true or false. Turing redefines this problem
as the actions of an a-machine, showing that in general we cannot construct
an a-machine to answer the decision problem. Since we cannot construct a
general a-machine to answer the decision problem, by extension Turing con-
cludes the decision problem is undecidable in elementary arithmetic.
Ultimately, only two answers to the decision problem exist: either the
statement is true, or it is false. What, then, if we had some other way of
answering the decision problem for an arbitrary statement in arithmetic? A
way that could not be expressed in terms of computational theory, but which
was still capable of giving a valid answer?
Once answered, the question could then be used in a theory of arithmetic.
The problem is that we cannot construct an axiomatic theory to both answer
the question and make use of the answer.
Could we, however, construct two different theories? One theory could
answer the question for us: although obviously this theory could not be con-
structed in the same manner as a theory of arithmetic. We could, though,
construct a modified axiomatic theory of arithmetic making use of the first
theory, allowing us to answer the general decision problem in this new, mod-
ified theory
Since a-machines cannot in general answer the decision problem, this
would still not lead to a full axiomatic theory. Nor could we express the
new theory simply in terms of the actions of an a-machine. But perhaps we
could create a new type of machine, allowing us to separate the two theories.
This would then allow us at least to state part of the theory in terms of the
actions of an a-machine (i.e. axiomatically).
§§ We will return to the details of Turing’s a-machines when we study strictly computational
theories in more detail in §4
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This argument is essentially the only one used by Turing in Systems of
Logic, although he also concluded that we could create these hybrid theories,
using a modified a-machine [31, pp. 172–173]:
Let us, therefore, suppose that we are supplied with some un-
specified means of solving number-theoretic problems; a kind of
oracle as it were. We shall not go any further into the nature of
this oracle apart from saying that it cannot be a machine. With
the help of the oracle we could then form a new kind of ma-
chine (call them o-machines), having as one of its fundamental
processes that of solving a given number-theoretic problem.
Note that oracle machines are not intrinsically any more powerful than a-
machines [31, §4, p. 173]. Within an axiomatic theory, the actions of both
types of machines are exactly equivalent [2, Chapter 24]. The only difference
between a-machines and o-machines is the reliance on the metatheory. For
a-machines their behaviour is independent of the metatheory, since the ax-
iomatic theory governing their behaviour and the metatheory are deemed to
be equivalent. Under computational assumptions, these conclusions also hold
for c-machines; since we are assuming the structural theories underpinning a-
machines and c-machines are equivalent.
By contrast, the general behaviour of o-machines can only be specified by
reference to both the axiomatic theory and the metatheory. Only in certain
special cases can we fully specify the actions of the o-machines using only
the axiomatic theories. Within this special case, the actions of the o-machines
are equivalent to the action of the a-machines. But only within this special
case can we ignore the metatheory. For o-machines in general, the metatheory
also acts as a filter, coercing the wider structures of the formal theory into an
axiomatic theory. This also leaves open the possibility of constructing more
general c-machines, if we base our choice mechanism on these wider formal
structures.
More general formal theory, then, can be used with axiomatic formal the-
ories. All we have to do is ensure that under certain conditions the complete-
ness and closure assumptions of the axiomatic formal theory can be met. We
can go further, since Turing arguments neatly divide the requirements of the
axiomatic formal theory from the requirements of the general formal theory.
We also know that this general formal theory can allow computation; for in-
stance computing the result of an arbitrary decision problem. Using Turing’s
arguments, we can elaborate on the general structure of formal theories out-
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Description Para-Description
Oracle
(b) The Machine View of a Formal The-
ory
FIGURE 4
The General Structure of Computation
lined in §2.2, and specifically on computation and computable theories.
Let us start with Turing’s o-machines, as an exemplar for computable the-
ories. We know each o-machine is essentially an a-machine, with equivalent
properties. Since each a-machine has a unique description governing the be-
haviour of the a-machine [30], o-machines also have such a description. The
nature of this description is unimportant, we only need to know that it exists.
Turing’s o-machines (like a-machines) move stepwise through the descrip-
tion, and for the moment we will also adopt that restriction.
For the sake of argument, we will assume the o-machine has reached a
certain point and that a next move is possible. For an a-machine the next
move can be deduced simply by applying the axioms to the current machine
description. But for an o-machine this might not be the case: the next move
may require consultation of the metatheory (via the oracle). In this case the
next move for the o-machine exists in a featureless, undifferentiated void;
about which the axioms of the o-machine can say nothing. We will call this
void the machine void, since the nature of the void depends partly on the
machine (as we shall soon see).
Nonetheless, an o-machine can access this void via the metatheory — if
the metatheory allows it. The metatheory, therefore, acts as a barrier between
the o-machine and the void. Together, these arguments produce a general
structure along the lines of Figure 4(a).
From the perspective of the o-machine, the metatheory acts as an oracle.
Note, however, that the o-machine cannot see ‘past’ the oracle: the void is not
part of the description of the o-machine. Nevertheless, the o-machine acts as
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though the description did extend ‘past’ the oracle. It can do this because it
can always apply the machine axioms to the current machine configuration.
But this can be no more than a projection of the axioms: the o-machine has no
guarantees over the actual structure and behaviour of the projection. We will,
therefore, call this projection the para-description of the machine, since it is
related to (but not the same as) the machine description. Thus the o-machine’s
view of the formal theory shown in Figure 4(a) looks more like Figure 4(b).
For an o-machine describing a complete and closed theory, the metatheory
must constrain the view of the void presented by the metatheory to the ma-
chine. Although we have argued for the structure in Figure 4 from the actions
of o-machines, we claim that this structure is applicable to both axiomatic
and more general formal theories. We make this claim because we can relax
the completeness and closure requirements of o-machines, while still creating
a formal theory under the control of the metatheory. Some of the machines
created using this general formal theory will be equivalent to axiomatic for-
mal theories of computation, such as the on used by a-machines. But other
models of computation will be more general than strictly axiomatic theories
allow, as we will explore in the following sections.
3 HYPOCOMPUTATION
Consider an o-machine mimicking the actions of an a-machine. The para-
description for the o-machine would obey the same rules as the machine de-
scription, and would be structurally equivalent to the machine description.
We could, though, imagine an o-machine at the other extreme, where the
o-machine consults the oracle for every move. This o-machine would effec-
tively have no para-description, since the behaviour of the machine is gov-
erned by the oracle and not the axioms of the machine|||| .
Nonetheless, if the metatheory is constructed so that the oracle obeys the
completeness and closure rules of the machine description, the o-machine
would act in every way as expected. Thus the simple presence or absence of
the para-description does not affect the behaviour of the o-machine. However,
this type of o-machine is completely reliant on the metatheory presenting a
para-description (through the oracle) in a manner consistent with the machine
description.
|||| In between these extremes a number of possibilities exist, usually referred to as the arith-
metic hierarchy. In an unpublished paper of the author, we show that this same basic scheme can
be used to describe all members of the arithmetic hierarchy [20].
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But what if the metatheory does not present the para-description in a man-
ner consistent with the machine description? Obviously if the metatheory
fails to uphold both the completeness and closure assumptions of the machine
description, the resultant machine is unlikely to resemble an o-machine (or be
anywhere near as useful). Nonetheless, we don’t have to drop both assump-
tions. We could allow the metatheory to preserve either the completeness or
the closure assumptions of the machine description.
We then enter the realm of computation we call hypocomputation, since we
obtain machines similar to, but less powerful than, o-machines. If we allow
the metatheory to preserve only the completeness assumptions of the machine
description in the para-description, we obtain machines we will call complete
hypocomputers. Likewise, if we allow the metatheory to preserve only the
closure assumptions of the machine description in the para-description, we
obtain closed hypocomputers.
The existence of a partial para-description is the key feature of a hypocom-
puter. For this partial para-description allows us to make some assumptions
about the machine void, and as a consequence to reason about some aspects
of the machines behaviour. Crucially, however, we cannot reason about the
entire behaviour of the machine, knowing only the machine description, or
the machine’s current configuration (as we can for computational machines).
But why should we even consider such machines?
From a theoretical perspective, hypocomputers are extremely useful, given
the relative scarcity of complete and closed formal theories. For example,
mathematical research during the late 19th century uncovered a large number
of useful formal theories containing paradoxes [19, Chapter III, §11]. Indeed
David Hilbert started his metamathematical program to find a paradox free
foundation for mathematics [11].
Modern developments in mathematics have largely followed Hilbert in for-
bidding paradoxes in formal theories. For instance Georg Cantor’s (naı¨ve) set
theory contains a number of interesting paradoxes, which modern axiomatic
set theories carefully step around [19, Chapter III, §12].
While computable theories can explore these modern, axiomatic theories
(as we saw in §1), the larger realm of formal theories remains out of reach.
Moreover, developments around Church’s Thesis suggest we will never be
able to reach this region of formal theory, if we insist on using only axiomatic
theories. However, we can explore these realms using the tool of hypocom-
putational formal theories, whose actions are naturally paradoxical.
Even if we are not interested in theories containing paradoxes, hypocom-
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putation has many practical uses. No modern computational machine truly
matches the assumptions of Turing’s a-machines. Instead we have learned
to build “almost” closed and complete devices whose behaviour is strongly
reminiscent of an a-machine.
As we said before, though, no axiomatic formal theory can be “almost
complete” or “almost closed”. Either the theory is complete or it is not. Like-
wise with closure.
At present, however, we are studying and defining the actions of mod-
ern computational machines using only axiomatic formal theories. But this
requires hiding the assumptions that “almost” match the formal axioms of
the theory with the machine description, making it hard to reason about the
machine’s behaviour [13]. If we focused instead on hypocomputational for-
mal theories, we might be able to reason more flexibly about the machine
behaviour: as long as we don’t expect perfection.
Hypocomputers are thus an unexplored area of formal theory with many
interesting theoretical and practical possibilities. Moreover, we already have
devices resembling hypocomputers to study, making this possibly the most
accessible realm of computation.
4 COMPUTATION
More traditional axiomatic computable theories have been well studied and
described by others [2, 14, 18]. We have also stated how our general picture
of formal theories relates specifically to these computational theories in §2.3
and in the introduction to §3, so we will consider only the barest details here.
Turing defined his a-machines by considering the actions of an idealised
human computer, concluding that [30, p. 231]:
We may compare a man in the process of computing a real
number to a machine which is only capable of a finite number of
conditions q1, q2, . . ., qR which will be called “m-configurations”.
The machine is supplied with a “tape”, (the analogue of paper)
running through it, and divided into sections (called “squares”)
each capable of bearing a “symbol”. At any moment there is just
one square, say the r-th, bearing the symbol S(r) which is “in
the machine”. We may call this square the “scanned square”.
The symbol on the scanned square may be called the “scanned
symbol”. The “scanned symbol” is the only one of which the
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FIGURE 5
A Sketch of a Turing a-machine
machine is, so to speak, “directly aware”. However, by altering
its m-configuration the machine can effectively remember some
of the symbols which it has “seen” (scanned) previously. The
possible behaviour of the machine at any moment is determined
by the m-configuration qn and the scanned symbol S(r). This
pair qn, S(r) will be called the “configuration”: thus the con-
figuration determines the possible behaviour of the machine. In
some of the configurations in which the scanned square is blank
(i.e. bears no symbol) the machine writes down a new symbol on
the scanned square: in other configurations it erases the scanned
symbol. The machine may also change the square which is being
scanned, but only by shifting it one place to right or 1eft.
These a-machines may also be represented graphically, along the lines of
Figure 5. We draw a tape divided into a series of squares, each one either
blank or containing a symbol. The machine (and its configuration) we show
asM in Figure 5, separated from the tape by the “head” of the machine. The
only view of the tape from the machine is via this head; more specifically the
machine can only see the scanned symbol (shown by the square marked with
a  in Figure 5).
Applying the same terminology used in the rest of the paper to Figure 5,M
is the machine description and the tape is the para-description of the machine.
The tape thus represents the machine’s view of the machine void. In an a-
machine, the para-description is always consistent with the machine void,
so the distinction between the para-description and the machine void can be
ignored. In effect the machine has direct access to the tape.
For an o-machine, however, the view of the machine void is mediated
by the metatheory. Thus the read-head appears to the machine as an oracle
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supplying the next symbol. Depending on the particular construction ofM,
an o-machine may or may not have a para-description for a particular move.
An o-machine’s view of the tape is thus governed by the metatheory (via the
oracle), as we would expect. The differences between the assumptions of
the a-machine and those of the o-machine can be used to produce a variety of
computational automata. As the details of these automata, and the distinctions
between them, are well studied and described [16, 27, 29], we will not discuss
them further in this paper.
5 HYPERCOMPUTATION
In general, then, the machine void (or “tape”) is only viewed indirectly by the
machine. Instead, the machine only has direct access to the para-description;
effectively the tape as the machine believes it exists. Usually this distinction
is irrelevant, since axiomatic formal theory assumes the behaviour of the void
is specified by the para-description of the machine.
If more than one machine exists, though, the machine may either share a
tape (machine void), or each machine may have its own tape (machine void).
Axiomatic theories assume but cannot prove these situations are equivalent.
In the general case, though, this assumption breaks down; as the decision
problem illustrates.
Hypercomputers resolve this problem by eliminating the possibility of ma-
chines using different voids. This situation cannot be described axiomatically,
since it requires the machine configuration of one machine to directly alter the
machine configuration of another. Nonetheless, this action is permitted within
the scope of formal theories.
To explore this problem in more detail, consider a simple a-machine read-
ing symbols from the “tape” and writing the same symbol back to the “tape”.
In general, this machine is asking the metatheory to supply the next symbol
from the machine void, which the machine then assumes is “written back” to
the machine void in some manner. However, since the machine cannot see
the machine void directly, the machine cannot differentiate between the two
situations illustrated in Figure 6. The difference between the situations be-
comes critical, though, when we try to relate machines; especially when we
use the behaviour of one machine to reason about another.
For example, consider a problem posed by Turing in On Computable Num-
bers. Just after Turing’s proof that the decision problem is undecidable for all
a-machines, Turing goes on to say [p. 248][30]:
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FIGURE 6
Two Outcomes for a Copy in a Formal Theory
We can show further that there can be no machine E which,
when applied with the S.D J(standard description## )K of an ar-
bitrary machine M, will determine whether M ever prints a
given symbol (0 say).
This proof is obtained by breaking the stated problem in to a sequence of
sub-problems, each described by a particular machine [30, p. 248]:
We will first show that, if there is a machine E , then there is
a general process for determining whether a given machine M
prints 0 infinitely often. LetM1 be a machine which prints the
same sequence asM, except that in the position where the first
0 printed byM stands,M1 prints 0.M2 is to have the first two
symbols 0 replaced by 0, and so on. Thus, ifM were to print
ABA01AAB0010AB . . .
thenM∞ would print
ABA01AAB0010AB . . .
andM∈ would print
ABA01AAB0010AB . . .
## Essentially, the standard description is the canonical sequence of symbols uniquely describ-
ing the particular a-machine under study ([30, §5]).
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Note how this sequence assumes the para-description of each machine is
shared, i.e. that the situation in Figure 6(a) applies. For instance, we assume
the input ofM1 is not only equivalent to the output ofM but is the output of
M. We can preserve the equivalence between the output ofM and the input
ofM1 whether the machine void is shared or not. But mere equivalence is
not sufficient. What we are claiming is that para-description of one machine
determines the behaviour of another. But the machine itself cannot make this
determination: only the metatheory can.
Moreover, if the machine voids are not overlapping, the metatheory will be
drawing the machine behaviour of the next machine from a different machine
void. The metatheory may be able to mask the difference, but in general the
machine will be unaware either way.
We can see this from Turing’s conclusion of the proof [30, p. 248]:
Now let F be a machine which, when supplied with the S.D
of M, will write down successively the S.D of M, of M1, of
M2, . . . (there is such a machine). We combine F with E and
obtain a new machine, G. In the motion of G first F is used to
write down the S.D ofM, and then E tests it, :0: is written if it is
found thatM never prints 0; then F writes the S.D ofM1 and
this is tested, :0: being printed if and only ifM1 never prints 0;
and so on. Now let us test G with E . If it is found that G never
prints 0, thenM prints 0 infinitely often; if G prints 0 sometimes,
thenM does not print 0 infinitely often.
M only exists if a general solution to the decision (halting) problem exists.
But a general solution to the decision problem is known to be impossible.
Turing thus concludesM cannot exist, and hence E cannot exist either [30,
p. 248].
Our problem lies in the definition of the a-machine F . This a-machine
can indeed create a succession of a-machine descriptions (M, M1, M2,
. . . ). However a-machine F cannot make any guarantees about the para-
description for any of these machines. We need this guarantee, though, to be
able to reason about the actions of any particular machine. For instance, to
ensure the symbol :0: is only printed “if and only ifM1 never prints 0”.
The only way to obtain this guarantee would be for the metatheory to en-
sure all machine voids overlap. Axiomatic theories, though, cannot them-
selves provide this guarantee (otherwise they could solve the decision prob-
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lem). If the metatheory can make this guarantee, the machine becomes not
computational but hypercomputational.
A hypercomputer, then, is simply a computational machine with a guaran-
tee that machine voids are always shared. Only under these conditions can we
use the para-description to reason about the action of the machine, as though
the metatheory did not exist.
6 PHYSICAL INSTANTIATION
Before we conclude, we will briefly examine a question often asked in the
hypercomputation literature: “can we actually build a hypercomputer”?
Answering this question successfully requires us to address two distinct
problems relating to a machine’s void. In essence, our problem is finding a
way of preserving the illusion that a particular machine’s projection serves as
a model of reality. This requires, firstly, that we can ensure the behaviour of
the machine’s void matches the projection of that machine, by, for instance,
ensuring the assumed ‘inputs’ to the machine do not violate the closure as-
sumptions of that particular machine. Secondly, we must find some way of
constraining the behaviour of the machine’s void; but without requiring phys-
ically impossible means to do it.
These problems may seem trivial, and indeed are often treated simply as
‘implementation details’. Nonetheless, if our experience with computational
machines is a reliable guide, neither condition is possible to satisfy fully.
Instead we have only been able to build “almost computational” machines:
learning instead to live with the consequences.
For example, we may decide to filter the inputs to the machine to meet
the first constraint. Any input value higher (or lower) than the machine will
accept is simply held to the maximum (or minimum). This behaviour is com-
mon in control systems — however it is not sufficient to fully meet the second
condition. What we need is not a means of ensuring the input does not ex-
ceed the maximum value, but that the input can not do so. What happens if
the filter itself malfunctions and enters an incorrect value into the system? If
the filter simply truncates a value to fit the input criterion, is this acceptable:
or have we just introduced an unexpected new behaviour into the machines
para-description?
In real systems, we must find some way of addressing these questions.
Control systems, for example, often have as many behaviours dedicated to
the detection of ‘errors’, as they do for actual control. Yet we have been
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Research Strand
Is the
Description
Closed?
Formal Yes Yes
Semi-formal Yes No
Object-Oriented No Yes
Holistic No No
TABLE 1
Assumptions of Software Descriptions by Research Strand [17, Table 3.1]
able to build computational control systems. Moreover, such systems are
in widespread use — indeed many human lives depend on them working as
expected.
Perhaps, then, the question should not be “can we build a hypercomputer”.
The simple answer to that question would appear to be no. But that still leaves
open the question: “how close can we get to building a hypercomputer”?
In answering that question we have nearly 60 years experience with “al-
most computers” to guide us. So let us briefly re-examine the two problems,
raised earlier, using this experience as a guide to question of whether we can
build an “almost hypercomputer”.
6.1 Projecting Into the Void
The expected behaviour of a machine’s void is, to a large extent, governed
by the design of that machine. Similarly, the actual behaviour of the ma-
chine’s void can be left to the implementation of the machine. Conveniently,
separating the ‘design’ phase from the ‘implementation’ phase has been a
longstanding principle in the implementation of computational machines. We
will, therefore, follow tradition and focus on the design of a hypercomputer in
this section, leaving the discussion of the implementation for the next section,
§6.2.
Researchers have been actively studying design methods for digital com-
putation machines since the late 1940s [3]. During this time, many hundreds
of methods have been proposed, giving a potentially vast pool of methods to
consider. Happily, though, all the methods in this pool rest on only a few
basic assumptions about the nature of the software description [17]. We can
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summarise these assumptions in Table 1.
Of these categories, only design methods from the formal strand assume
a complete and closed description. Given the reliance of hypercomputation
on complete and closed description, it seems safe to assume we could reuse
these methods for the design of a hypercomputer. But could we go further?
We know from experience with strictly computational machines, that in-
completeness and openness in the wider software description can (an indeed
must) be eliminated from the executable program description. The problem
in conventional software design, though, is achieving this elimination without
compromising the intent of the software description [17, Chapter 9].
Hypercomputation, though, removes one of the main problems with for-
mal design methods, namely the inability to separate actions that create new
machine voids from actions that copy into the same machine void. This, in
turn, makes it considerably easier to cleanly separate software assumptions
from program assumptions, easing the entire design process.
For example, consider one of the oldest design principles used by many
conventional software and program design methods: coupling and cohesion,
first defined by Glenford Myers and Larry Constantine in the early 1970s.
Broadly, “coupling is a measure of how connected two items are, and cohe-
sion is a measure of how much something makes sense” [1]. While this def-
inition maybe vague, many researchers have attempted to make use of these
metrics, leading to the ‘definition’ of cohesion shown in Table 2.
While cohesion may be popular in both program and software design
methods, we can easily show cohesion is impossible to define in axiomatic
formal theories. As a metric, cohesion therefore makes little sense in the
design of programs for conventional computers.
For instance, consider the description of the four self-contained functions
shown in Figure 7; function A, function B, function C and function D. For
simplicity’s sake, each of these functions only relies on itself for its definition,
and each function is unrelated in intent or purpose. Design 1 in Figure 7(a)
shows all four functions in the same module, M1. Therefore, Module M1
has coincidental cohesion (following Table 2); the lowest level of cohesion.
Since each function is unrelated, we should separate each function into its
own module, producing design 2 shown in Figure 7(b). According to Table 2,
this design now has the highest level of cohesion, functional cohesion.
As program descriptions, the two designs in Figure 7 are functionally
equivalent. It is a trivial task to map one to the other. However, the design in
Figure 7(a) has only one machine void, whereas the design in Figure 7(b) has
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Level Name Level Description Cohesion
Level
Object Each operation provides func-
tionality which allows object at-
tributes to be modified or in-
spected
Very High
Functional Each part of the module is nec-
essary for the execution of a sin-
gle function
Very High
Sequential The output from element in the
module serves as the input for
some other module
High
Communicational All of the elements of a module
operate on the same input data
or produce the same output data
Medium
Procedural All elements of a module de-
scribe a single control sequence
Medium
Temporal All modules that are activated
at a single time are grouped to-
gether
Medium
Logical Modules that perform similar
functions are put together into a
single module
Low
Coincidental Parts of a module are not related
by simply bundled into a single
module
Very Low
TABLE 2
Levels of Cohesion [21, 22, 25, 28]
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M1
f(C) f(D)
f(A) f(B)
(a) Design 1
M12 M13
M10 M11
f(C) f(D)
f(A) f(B)
(b) Design 2
FIGURE 7
Two Equivalent Module Designs
between one and four. That is, all the machines might be sharing a common
void, or each machine might be interfacing to a distinct void. Or we might be
in a situation in-between these extremes. But under no circumstances can the
axiomatic theories tell us which situation we are dealing with. So while the
designs in Figure 7 are functionally equivalent, the implemented behaviour
of the two design may be very different.
In the design of conventional computers, solving this problem is non-
trivial (and indeed impossible in general). For a hypercomputer, though, we
know the creation of new machine voids is forbidden. If Figure 7 referred to
hypercomputational design, then we know that each design has exactly one
machine void. This makes it much easier to reason about the machine be-
haviour, since changes in the designed behaviour can be more easily isolated
from the implemented behaviour.
6.2 Constraining the Void
While reasoning about hypercomputational design may be easier, implement-
ing hypercomputers is likely to prove much more difficult than conventional
computers. For the same properties that favour the design process, work
against us in the implementation phase. By forbidding overlapping voids
every part of the hypercomputational description is exposed to all changes to
the common machine void. This means the behaviour of the void is far more
critical, because at no point can the behaviour of the void violate the closure
and completeness assumptions of any part of the machine description.
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Currently, this point is poorly understood in many proposed physical im-
plementations of hypercomputers. For conventional computers, we can use
non-overlapping machines to contain violations of the closure and complete-
ness assumptions. Some physical implementations even exploit this separa-
tion of machine voids, easing the implementations of the machine.
However, this approach is completely invalid for hypercomputational ma-
chines, since we cannot isolate a single machine void from any other. Even
so, most proposed hypercomputers follow a split model similar to Turing o-
machines discussed in §2.3. But hypercomputers cannot be o-machines: both
sides of the split use the same machine void, with the same completeness and
closure assumptions.
For example, a particularly problematic (though common) implementation
of a hypercomputer involves signalling the result of a computation to a con-
ventional computer. Such a scheme requires not only that each part obey the
completeness and closure assumption, but every possible path between the
two parts. What happens if one part fails and sends/receives the signal incor-
rectly? Can we guarantee absolutely that no signal received only occurs if no
signal is sent?
These are not simply ‘implementation details’. Our hypercomputer is us-
ing the behaviour of the void to guarantee certain completeness and closure
assumptions. Any behaviour of the void that violates these assumptions will
be disastrous and render the machine useless.
Take, for instance, the common assumptions about time, explicit (and
sometimes) implicit in some proposed hypercomputers. Open descriptions
do not have a natural distinction between past, present and future, since they
lack regions we can easily isolate. Similarly, incomplete descriptions natu-
rally create undecidable statements, again making it hard to create definite
statements about time from the machine’s perspective.
If the universe forbids any openness or incompleteness regarding time,
then we could use temporal assumptions as the foundation for completeness
or closure assumptions. But if the universe does not forbid openness or in-
completeness, then in general temporal inferences to bolster completeness
and closure assumptions will be invalid. We might be able to side-step these
issues, for example by using a Newtonian temporal model, but we are unlikely
ever to be able to implement such a machine in this universe.
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7 CONCLUSION
In summary, metamathematical arguments allow us to propose and investi-
gate a much wider range of formal theories than the usual axiomatic formal
theories. These more general theories, though, require significant changes to
our common assumptions regarding formal theories.
We can abandon the completeness or closure assumptions of axiomatic
formal theories, creating a theory partially determined by the ‘axioms’ of the
system. From these theories we can also create a weaker class of computation,
which we call hypocomputation.
Moving in the other direction is also possible, but this again requires creat-
ing metatheories with properties not fully shared with axiomatic formal the-
ories. Moreover, while these hypercomputational machines may exist in the-
ory, implementing them is likely to prove extremely difficult since these ma-
chines place strong requirements on the undetermined (and undeterminable)
actions of the machine.
The behaviour of both hypocomputational and hypercomputational ma-
chines may seem strange in comparison to the usual computational machines.
Nonetheless, our long experience with axiomatic formal theories has taught
us a great deal about the properties of these machines. Moreover, our expe-
rience with metamathematics has taught us how few of our ‘commonsense’
assumptions about the foundations of mathematics and number theory hold
as general assumptions. If we are prepared to abandon our search for univer-
sal theories (and machines), we can readily build on these wider structures
of mathematics. Nor is the act of abandonment in any way extreme. We can
(and do) build hypocomputers. Perhaps we may yet be able to use this expe-
rience, and our knowledge of the wider structures of mathematics, to build a
true computer.
In the distant future, we may also learn how to erect machines on the
foundations of hypercomputational theory. Our inability to do so at present,
though, in no way detracts from our ability to explore the realm of hypercom-
putation.
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